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I  -     K . D intelligent design trial, the plaintiffs (objecting to a four-paragraph state-
ment read in biology class) summoned a curious expert witness: John F. 
Haught, former chairman of Georgetown University’s theology department. 
Asked to identify the antecedents of intelligent design Professor Haught 
pointed to !omas Aquinas’ five arguments for the existence of God, “one of 
which was to argue from the design and complexity and order and pattern in 
the universe to the existence of an ultimate intelligent designer.”1
Intelligent design (ID) was on trial because (in biology at least) it con-
flicts with Darwin’s theory as taught in the classroom: modern Darwinian 
evolution claims that random mutation and natural selection, defined as 
purposeless and unguided processes, are sufficient to explain the stunning 
features of living things, while intelligent design claims there is evidence that 
at least some things are better explained by an intelligent cause.2
Haught slightly mischaracterized !omas’ argument, which says noth-
ing about complexity per se. But !omas certainly made a design argument 
by appealing to features of the natural world, as do contemporary ID theo-
rists. Despite these similarities, however, some modern !omists claim that 
!omism is compatible with Darwinian evolution and incompatible with 
intelligent design. So which is it? Are !omas’ writings a precursor to in-
telligent design as even such design-critics as Haught claim? Or is Darwin 
compatible with—and ID irreconcilable with—!omas’ philosophical and 
theological framework? Or is there some third possibility? For the Catholic, 
these are important questions, because St. !omas is the gold standard of 
Catholic thought—not infallible, to be sure, but trustworthy.
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T  D
I    of Darwinian evolution, Christian philosophy, 
and intelligent design one is likely to hear that St. !omas had no problem 
with secondary causes operating in nature and that St. Augustine knew that 
the Bible is “not a science textbook.” Both of these are true, as far as they go. 
Unfortunately, such platitudes only obscure deeper sources of tension be-
tween Darwinism and !omistic thought. Here I would like to explore three 
intimately related sources of tension: the problem of essences, the problem of 
transformism, and the problem of formal causation.
!e Problem of Essences
First, the problem of essences. G. K. Chesterton once quipped: “Evolution 
... does not especially deny the existence of God; what it does deny is the 
existence of man.”3 It might appear shocking, but in this one remark the ev-
er-perspicacious Chesterton summarized a serious conflict between classical 
Christian philosophy and Darwinism.
In Aristotelian and !omistic thought, each particular organism be-
longs to a certain universal class of things. Each individual shares a particular 
nature—or essence—and acts according to its nature. Squirrels act squirrel-
ly and cats catty. We know with certainty that a squirrel is a squirrel because 
a crucial feature of human reason is its ability to abstract the universal nature 
from our sense experience of particular organisms.
!ink about it: How is it that we are able to recognize different organ-
isms as belonging to the same group? !e Aristotelian provides a good an-
swer: It is because species really exist—not as an abstraction in the sky, but 
they exist nonetheless. We recognize the squirrel’s form, which it shares 
with other members of its species, even though the particular matter of each 
squirrel differs. So each organism, each unified whole, consists of a material 
and immaterial part (form). (“Species” here is a more encompassing concept 
than in modern biological definitions. For example, wolves and domesticated 
dogs might share a common essence.)
One way to see this form-matter distinction is as Aristotle’s solution to 
the ancient tension between change and permanence debated so vigorously 
in the pre-Socratic era. Heraclitus argued that change is the underlying real-
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ity. Everything constantly changes, like fire which never stays the same from 
moment to moment. Philosophers like Parmenides (and Zeno of “Zeno’s 
paradoxes” fame) argued exactly the opposite; there is no change. Despite 
appearances, reality is permanent. How else could we have knowledge? If 
reality constantly changes, how can we know it? What is to be known?
Aristotle solved this dilemma by postulating that while matter is con-
stantly in flux—even now some somatic cells are leaving my body while oth-
ers arrive—an organism’s form is stable. It is a fixed reality, and for this rea-
son it is a steady object of our knowledge. Organisms have an essence which 
can be grasped intellectually.
Enter Darwinism. Recall that Darwin sought to explain the origin of 
“species.” Yet as Darwin pondered his theory he realized that it destroyed 
species as a reality altogether. For Darwinism suggests that any matter can 
potentially morph into any other arrangement of matter without the aid of 
an organizing principle. He thought cells were like simple blobs of Jell-O, 
easily rearrangeable. For Darwin, there is no immaterial, immutable form. 
In !e Origin of Species he writes:
I look at the term species as one arbitrarily given, for the sake of con-
venience, to a set of individuals closely resembling each other, and 
that it does not essentially differ from the term variety, which is given 
to less distinct and more fluctuating forms. !e term variety, again, 
in comparison with mere individual differences, is also applied arbi-
trarily, for convenience’s sake.4
Statements like this should make card-carrying !omists shudder. !is is an 
extreme expression of the anti-Aristotelian (and anti-!omist) philosophy of 
nominalism. Nominalism (stemming from the Latin “nomen,” or “name”) 
suggests that the individual is the only reality—not the universal, form, or 
essence. !e mind invents universals in order to group together similar ob-
jects. But the universal is not a reality in which the individual in some way 
participates.
But !omas embraced form and, following Augustine, even maintained 
that a creature’s form reflects the second member of the Trinity. For, “as it 
[the creature] has a form and species, it represents the Word as the form of 
the thing made by art is from the conception of the craftsman.”5
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!e first conflict between Darwinism and !omism, then, is the de-
nial of true species or essences. For the !omist, this denial is a grave error, 
because the essence of the individual (the species in the Aristotelian sense) 
is the true object of our knowledge. As Benjamin Wiker observes in Moral 
Darwinism, Darwin reduced species to “mere epiphenomena of matter in 
motion.”6 What we call a “dog,” in other words, is really just an arbitrary 
snapshot of the way things look at present. If we take the Darwinian view, 
Wiker suggests, there is no species “dog” but only a collection of individuals, 
connected in a long chain of changing shapes, which happen to resemble each 
other today but will not tomorrow.
Now we see Chesterton’s point. Man, the universal, does not really exist. 
According to the late Stanley Jaki, Chesterton detested Darwinism because 
“it abolishes forms and all that goes with them, including that deepest kind 
of ontological form which is the immortal human soul.”7 And if one does not 
believe in universals, there can be, by extension, no human nature—only a 
collection of somewhat similar individuals.
Classical notions of ethics were radically dependent upon this notion of 
a real, knowable human nature. Aristotle and others often argued for what 
is ethical in terms of what leads to human flourishing and fulfillment. Yet if 
there is no human nature, how can we know what human fulfillment looks 
like in general? Tim and Tom might, then, flourish under different moral 
codes. Lack of a human nature may leave us with “different strokes for dif-
ferent folks.”
As philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre showed in After Virtue, the way out 
of this modern dilemma is to recognize that if something’s nature includes 
purposes or proper functions, then “oughts” follow from that which “is.”8 
For if man is a certain sort of being, if he has a certain formal nature, then 
there are facts about how man ought to behave. !ere are objective criteria 
by which we can judge a human being good or bad. !is kind of telos-infused 
nature cannot be sustained by Darwinism, however, for Darwinism denies 
that organisms have formal natures or are purposefully made.
But the Darwinian will say, “We believe in function, too!” True, the 
Darwinian knows of function—that ears hear, for example. But to say in the 
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Darwinian sense that the function of ears is to hear, notes philosopher Lydia 
McGrew, is only to say that the information encoding ears was passed to 
progeny because ears happened to hear—and that hearing, presumably, gave 
these organisms some survival advantage. If in 10,000 years humans walk on 
their hands because this somehow aids survival, the Darwinian cannot claim 
that hands are meant for walking, only that hands in fact do walk at this 
time.9 !at is, the Darwinian cannot support the notion of proper function.
!is is not a mere abstract point. !e dilemma is playing itself out in 
contemporary debates in bioethics. Who are bioethicists like Leon Kass 
(neo-Aristotelian and former chairman of the President’s Council on Bio-
ethics) sparring with today if not thoroughgoing Darwinians like Princeton’s 
Peter Singer who deny that humans, qua humans, have intrinsic dignity? 
Singer even calls those who prefer humans to other animals “speciesist,” 
which in his warped vocabulary is akin to racism.10
So what justifies the excessive expense and effort required to keep a 
Down’s syndrome baby alive? For the traditionalist, it is the baby’s mem-
bership in the human species. !is gives the baby intrinsic value. For the 
utilitarian like Singer such expense is not justified; one would do better to 
contribute to the World Wildlife Fund, for species’ differences are not es-
sential but accidental. As Singer notes: 
All we are doing is catching up with Darwin.... He showed in the 
19th century that we are simply animals. Humans had imagined we 
were a separate part of Creation, that there was some magical line 
between Us and !em. Darwin’s theory undermined the foundations 
of that entire Western way of thinking about the place of our species 
in the universe.11
If one must choose between saving an intelligent, fully developed pig or the 
Downs Syndrome baby, Singer thinks we should opt for the pig. Perhaps 
this is why natural law theorist J. Budziszewski writes, “If any contemporary 
scientific movement holds promise for the furtherance of the natural law tra-
dition, it is not the stale dogma of natural selection, but frank recognition of 
natural design.”12
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!e Problem of Transformism
!e second conflict is very similar to the first. !e !omist, as we have seen, 
is committed to the reality of universals, for universals are the objects of 
higher knowledge. But it is not only the existence of species which Darwin-
ism destroys; it is also their stability.
Darwinian !eory posits that all living things are related through one or 
very few ancestors (referred to as “Universal Common Ancestry”) via solely 
material processes. But if living things have unchangeable essences, how can 
these living things change (or “transform”) into other living things through 
mere material causes?
One !omist recently put it this way to a gathering of the American 
Maritain Association: “For those defending at least some aspects of the clas-
sical idea of essences, the problem can be stated as follows: how can one kind 
of living substance with its own unique essence change into another kind? 
And beyond the how, why would this happen in the natural world? What 
intrinsic end or ends would it serve?”13
For Darwin, there was no problem to solve, for there are no essential dif-
ferences between living things. We see this assumption at work in every new 
primatological study finding that apes have an inner mental life, use sign lan-
guage, or form hierarchical social structures “ just like we do!” !e !omist 
should see this as hyperbolic, for his starting point is our everyday experi-
ence of the world. And as David Berlinski sardonically observes, the first and 
most obvious fact about apes is that they are “behind the bars of their cages 
and we are not.” Put plainly, “Beyond what we have in common with the apes, 
we have nothing in common, and while the similarities are interesting, the 
differences are profound.”14
We should not be too flippant about this, however. Supporters of Dar-
win’s theory are no doubt right that apes’ capacities are more similar to ours 
than are, say, alpacas’. But sometimes these similarities serve to hide real 
transitional difficulties. British literary critic A. N. Wilson gives a fine ex-
ample from his atheist days:
A materialist Darwinian was having dinner with me a few years ago 
and we laughingly alluded to how, as years go by, one forgets names. 
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Eager, as committed Darwinians often are, to testify on any occasion, 
my friend asserted: “It is because when we were simply anthropoid 
apes, there was no need to distinguish between one another by giving 
names.”
!is creedal confession struck me as just as superstitious as be-
lieving in the historicity of Noah’s Ark. More so, really.
Do materialists really think that language just “evolved,” like 
finches’ beaks, or have they simply never thought about the matter 
rationally? Where’s the evidence? How could it come about that hu-
man beings all agreed that particular grunts carried particular con-
notations? How could it have come about that groups of anthropoid 
apes developed the amazing morphological complexity of a single 
sentence, let alone the whole grammatical mystery which has en-
gaged Chomsky and others in our lifetime and linguists for time out 
of mind? No, the existence of language is one of the many phenom-
ena—of which love and music are the two strongest—which suggest 
that human beings are very much more than collections of meat.15
For the Darwinian, complex biological realities exist for the sake of their 
smaller units of composition. Richard Dawkins has gone so far as to suggest 
that we are the pawns of our selfish genes. In this view, biological reality is 
a continuum, and the smallest units of composition run the show. Species’ 
differences—indeed, even individual organisms—are mere accidents of en-
vironment and mutation.
But for !omas, “the elements are for the sake of the compounds, the 
compounds for the sake of living things.”16 !at is, reality is decidedly dis-
continuous, hierarchical, top-down. !e entire point of essences is that they 
are stable realities; they cannot change and thus can provide real knowledge. 
!e differences between species (intelligible essences) are differences of kind. 
!us those defending the tradition of natural philosophy found in Aristotle 
and St. !omas simply cannot accept transformism—at least not without 
introducing teleological conceptions of change, which would transform Dar-
winian !eory itself.
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!e Problem of Formal Causation
Finally, before moving to consider intelligent design, there is the problem of 
formal causation. It is here that we find St. !omas’ unique contribution, 
illuminating the insights of Aristotle with the light of Christian knowledge.
St. !omas argued against the Islamic scholars of his day who held that 
God is the direct cause of everything in nature, a view known as occasional-
ism. Put negatively, occasionalism denies that creatures exercise their own 
causal powers. It is God who always acts as the only cause; creatures only 
appear to cause effects. “On the contrary,” as !omas is fond of saying, God 
created creatures with real natures that have real powers. !us, ants act in an 
ant-like fashion. Ants themselves cause effects.
God is, of course, also a true cause of ant behavior: He created ants, he 
sustains ants in being, and he concurs (co-operates) with every ant action. 
According to Notre Dame philosopher Alfred Freddoso, this last aspect was 
extremely important to medieval Aristotelians: “It cannot be emphasized 
enough that the position being rejected here (viz., that God’s action in the 
world is exhausted by creation and conservation) is regarded as too weak 
by almost all medieval Aristotelians.”17 !ese medieval thinkers would be 
scandalized by the claims of those modern Christian thinkers who exclude 
God from nature except as the First Cause and a merely bureaucratic role as 
sustainer of the universe.
So !omas believed in true secondary causes. In a certain sense it is true 
that God causes everything. But in the act of creation God also delegates 
to creatures the power to act as true causes of their creaturely behavior, ac-
cording to their natures. Because Aristotle is so well known for recognizing 
teleology intrinsic to living things, and because !omas is so well known for 
this view of secondary causation, some of today’s !omists think that their 
tradition can whole-heartedly embrace Darwinian evolution. After all, Dar-
win just claimed nature is due to secondary causes, right? Nature just “does 
its own thing.” It is this drastic over-simplification which lies at the heart of 
the casual acceptance of Darwinism among some classically thinking people 
today. We must dig deeper.
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Recall that for !omas, creatures are a combination of form and matter. 
!e question that must be answered, then, in any version of !omistic evolu-
tion, is where form comes from. Darwin, denying Aristotelian essentialism, 
saw organisms’ traits as accidental properties of living things that change 
with the winds of time. Not so St. !omas.
In his recent book Aquinas on the Divine Ideas as Exemplar Causes, Cath-
olic University philosophy professor Gregory T. Doolan gives the most ex-
tensive treatment to date of !omas’ notion of “exemplar causation.”
Exemplar causes are an integral part of !omas’ metaphysics. An exem-
plar cause is a type of formal cause—a sort of blueprint; the idea according 
to which something is organized. For !omas, these ideas exist separately 
from the things they cause. For instance, if a boy is going to build a soap-box 
derby car, the idea in his mind is separate from the form of the car; yet the 
car’s form expresses the idea, or exemplar cause, in the boy’s mind. Exemplar 
causes actually do something. !ey are “practical ideas,” writes Doolan.18
For !omas (and here is the important point) a creature’s form comes 
from a similar form in the divine intellect. In other words, the cause of each 
species’s form is extrinsic. In fact, writes !omas, “God is the first exemplar 
cause of all things.”19 Creatures do possess the causal powers proper to the 
nature God granted them, but creatures most certainly do not possess the 
power to create the form of their or any other species.
For instance, frog parents have the proper ability to generate tadpoles. 
!ey are able to bring out the natural form that is present in the potentiality 
of matter. However, the frog parents cannot create the form “frog.” After all, 
!omas reasons, if frog parents could create the form “frog” they would be 
the creators of their own form, and this is clearly a contradiction. Natural 
things can generate forms of the same species, but they cannot create the form 
of a species in general.
!us natural agency is not eliminated, yet God is still actively involved in 
nature. Specific forms originate and reside in his mind, though God allows 
creatures the dignity of acting in this creative drama. Still, !omas is careful 
to note that while secondary causes are real, “God ... can cause an effect to 
result in anything whatsoever independently of middle causes.”20
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By now it should be clear how different !omas’ philosophy of nature 
is from Darwinism. For !omas, form is not merely an apparent reality 
that can be molded into any other form. Rather, a natural form originates 
in God’s mind. He directly create it. It is a forethought, so to speak, not an 
afterthought. Species, then, come to be because of his will and power (either 
successively or all at once). !ey are neither the product of a trial and error 
process of natural selection nor the mere intrinsic unfolding of secondary 
causes. Secondary causes have their place, but they are inherently impotent 
to create novel form.
Let’s face it: !omas Aquinas was not evolutionist, let alone a Darwinist, 
in any sense.
T  I D
G    of God in nature in !omas’ system, one might 
think today’s !omists would encourage the pursuit of signs of intelligent 
design in nature. Yet in recent years, some !omists have shied away from 
ID. !ey do so not only because of lax scrutiny of the tensions just discussed 
but also because of three common misperceptions of ID: First, that ID is 
“mechanistic” and even embraces a “modernist” view of science; second, that 
ID is a “God of the gaps” theory; and third, that ID is inherently “interven-
tionist.” While many !omists harbor doubts about the more extravagant 
claims of Darwinian science, taken together these three factors make it diffi-
cult for some !omists to embrace intelligent design. !at is as unnecessary 
as it is unfortunate.
Is ID Mechanistic and Modernist?
One of the defining hallmarks of modern !omism is its strong rejection of 
early modern philosophy as seen in René Descartes and Francis Bacon. To 
simplify, modernists reduce Aristotle’s four causes down to only two causes, 
and, as a result, reduce all knowledge to empirical knowledge. Both moves 
strike directly at !omistic philosophy, so it is no surprise that they have 
aroused !omists’ ire.
“Causes” in Aristotle’s sense explain why something is the way it is, and 
as !omas explains, “there are four kinds of cause, namely, the material, ef-
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ficient, formal and final.”21 Aristotle and !omas would explain a marble 
statue by reference to its material cause (the marble), its efficient cause (the 
sculptor), its formal cause (the shape of the statue), and its final cause (the 
purpose of honoring Athena). A modernist, in contrast, sees only material 
man and marble at work. Ultimately, all is explained by atoms in motion—
not by immaterial ideas, forms, or purposes. !us for the modernist, knowl-
edge is necessarily and exclusively knowledge of the empirical.
Some !omists insist that ID is methodologically flawed because they 
think that ID, like modernism, rejects formal and final causation. !is is 
incorrect. Far from rejecting final causation, ID theorists argue that there is 
empirical evidence of purpose or teleology in nature. !ey argue that at least 
some features of nature are best explained by intelligent activity, since such 
features exhibit evidence of foresight and planning.
By reintroducing intelligent causes as a legitimate scientific pursuit, and 
by rejecting the Darwinian notion that material and efficient causes suffice 
to explain nature, ID theorists may well open the door for renewed attention 
to formal and final causes. !omists should welcome ID as a partner.
Still, some !omists insist that ID inherently views nature mechanisti-
cally. !ose who say this consistently have in mind Michael Behe’s argument 
for the “irreducible complexity” of what are referred to in the scientific lit-
erature as “molecular machines.” !ey seem to forget that !omas repeat-
edly used analogies between living objects and man-made artifacts. So they 
should hardly be offended that Behe would compare some aspects of micro-
biological structures to machines.
Besides, ID arguments propose the very opposite of mechanism—agen-
cy. Consider Stephen Meyer’s argument concerning the informational con-
tent of DNA. In Signature in the Cell, Meyer argues that blind material causes 
are insufficient to produce the immaterial information content of DNA. An 
immaterial mind, Meyer claims, is a better explanation than any mindless, 
material cause.22
Some !omist critics go one step further and claim that ID concedes a 
modernist, Enlightenment view of science. Perhaps this is because ID pro-
ponents insist that ID arguments fall within the domain of natural science. 
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But this criticism has things precisely backward: ID theorists challenge the 
Enlightenment notion that only matter matters, that science cannot take im-
material concepts like mental causation seriously. ID challenges this directly, 
noting that while materialist science may have seemed plausible in the age of 
steam, it is hardly plausible in today’s world of the information super-high-
way—run on the power of the invisible and the immaterial. According to ID 
theorists, accounting for nature in all its richness requires that we appeal not 
just to material but to personal causes as well.
Moreover, the claim that design is empirically detectable concedes noth-
ing to the modernist idea that reason is limited to the empirical realm. Nor 
does anything in ID imply that only science can provide real knowledge. One 
can argue for empirical evidence of design and also defend, say, knowledge 
of divine revelation, moral knowledge, knowledge of abstract essences and 
knowledge derived from philosophical arguments for the existence of God.
Does ID Promote the “God of the Gaps”?
!e second confusion regards the claim that intelligent design is a “God of 
the gaps” argument. As !omist Edward Feser writes, “Aquinas does not 
argue in this lame ‘God of the gaps’ manner.... Paley did, and ‘Intelligent 
Design’ theorists influenced by him do as well.”23 Expressed more formally, a 
“gaps” argument is known as an argument from ignorance. !ese arguments 
base claims upon what one does not know rather than upon what one does 
know. Critics misconstrue contemporary ID arguments (and perhaps Paley’s 
as well) as, “I do not know how this feature of the natural world arose via 
material causes; therefore God did it!”
Yet this too is simply a misunderstanding. ID is not an argument for 
God’s existence. Rather, it is an inference to an intelligent cause. Some people 
think ID theorists are being coy, but they just want to avoid overstating their 
argument. !omas drew the same distinction in Summa contra Gentiles:
For seeing that natural things run their course according to a fixed 
order, and since there cannot be order without a cause of order, men, 
for the most part, perceive that there is one who orders the things 
that we see. But who or of what kind this cause of order may be, or 
whether there be but one, cannot be gathered from this general con-
sideration.24
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So there’s certainly nothing anti-!omistic in distinguishing between a ge-
neric argument for design and an argument for God’s existence—even if the 
former might provide evidence for the latter.
Furthermore, ID—whether true or false—is not an argument from ig-
norance. ID proponents argue from the known features of natural objects, 
the known causal capacities of agents in our everyday experience and the 
known limits of certain material causes. In fact, this is the same method that 
makes !omism so appealing. Experience teaches us that some effects in our 
everyday observation of the cause-and-effect structure of the world always 
come from intelligent agents. Material causes simply do not suffice to explain 
some things.
If, for instance, I come home and find that the magnetic letters on the re-
frigerator say “I love Daddy,” I know that a mind rather than material causes 
alone (e.g., strong winds blowing through the kitchen window) produced the 
message. I already have numerous experiences with written language; I know 
the limits of material causes in this arena. ID merely formalizes this com-
mon experience with analytic rigor.
Take Stephen Meyer’s argument mentioned previously. Meyer argues 
that DNA, which contains the same semantic quality as human language, 
also comes from a mind. He surveys today’s most prominent materialistic 
theories for the origin of DNA’s specified complexity and concludes they lack 
the causal resources to explain this salient property of DNA. But intelligent 
agency does not. !us, judged by standard modes of reasoning in the histori-
cal sciences, intelligent agency is a better explanation. !e form of Meyer’s 
argument is precisely the same as Darwin’s. (Darwin learned it from Sir 
Charles Lyell, the founder of modern geology.) !e method involves looking 
to presently operating causes to explain past events in natural history. DNA 
is often called a “code,” and if Meyer is correct the metaphor runs deeper 
than materialist philosophy ever dreamt.
Is ID Interventionist?
Finally, as we have already seen, in arguing against the occasionalists St. 
!omas affirmed that God has given nature causal capacities of its own. 
!ey are bounded, of course, by certain actions of which only God is capable, 
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but nature has its role nonetheless. And this fact has led certain !omists 
to an aesthetic preference for scientific theories that do not involve God’s 
“interference” in nature. !ey are wary of ID’s seeming “interventionism.”
Whereas materialists must be non-interventionists, theists have more 
explanatory resources at their disposal. !us it seems that the evidence 
should decide the matter for theists. Perhaps it is logically possible that God 
limited himself to secondary causes in natural history, but we cannot deduce 
that beforehand. If the fossil record remains discontinuous despite the oc-
casional media hype of a new “missing link,”25 and if field studies of natural 
selection continue to show that natural selection merely keeps populations 
healthy, then so be it.26 Maybe God acted as a primary cause at different 
periods in life’s history.
Christians already believe this. !ey recite it in every creed. As Avery 
Cardinal Dulles—an advocate for teleological evolution—wrote:
Christian Darwinists run the risk of conceding too much to their 
atheistic colleagues. !ey may be over-inclined to grant that the 
whole process of emergence takes place without the involvement of 
any higher agency. !eologians must ask whether it is acceptable to 
banish God from his creation in this fashion.... [God] raised Jesus 
from the dead. If God is so active in the supernatural order, produc-
ing effects that are publicly observable, it is difficult to rule out on 
principle all interventions in the process of evolution. Why should 
God be capable of creating the world from nothing but incapable of 
acting within the world he has made?27
For Christians this is surely a needed warning against swallowing popu-
lar prejudices. But even so, is the intelligent design proponent necessarily 
committed to God’s repeated intervention in the natural world? Absolutely 
not. Postulating intelligent agency as a necessary causal ingredient for cer-
tain features of nature does not commit one to exactly when or how this 
feature arrived on the scene. Just recall the letters on my refrigerator: I can-
not be certain who put them there, or how, or when, but I surely know the 
arrangement is intelligently designed.
Catholic biochemist and ID proponent Michael Behe, for one, thinks it 
unlikely that God intervened directly in the development of the biological 
realm. Rather, he speculates that God may have front-loaded the informa-
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tion and laws necessary to humanity’s development into the beginning of the 
universe. Behe thinks
... the assumption that design unavoidably requires “interference” 
rests mostly on a lack of imagination. !ere’s no reason that the ex-
tended fine-tuning view ... necessarily requires active meddling with 
nature.... One simply has to envision that the agent who caused the 
universe was able to specify from the start not only laws, but much 
more.28
Intelligent design by natural laws and initial specifications is still intelligent 
design, and it may be detectable in the same way as the “fine-tuning” of the 
laws of physics. !e detectable effects of intelligent design could be the same, 
however that design was implemented.
!omas himself, far from being worried about intervention, thought 
there was good reason to think that God purposefully “intervenes” in na-
ture, writing that
the divine power [can] at times work apart from the order assigned 
by God to nature, without prejudice to His providence. In fact He 
does this sometimes to manifest His power. For by no other means 
can it better be made manifest that all nature is subject to the divine 
will, than by the fact that sometimes He works independently of the 
natural order: since this shows that the order of things proceeded 
from Him, not of natural necessity, but of His free will.29
!omas’ way of speaking here is more helpful than speaking of “intervention,” 
which is often used pejoratively. In !omas’ view, when God acts directly 
in nature he is not invading foreign territory, tampering with something he 
should have fixed earlier, or violating natural laws established in opposition 
to his will. He is acting within the world that he created and that he sustains 
from moment to moment. If he sometimes chooses to act independently of 
the natural order, to bring about results that would not have happened if na-
ture were left to its own devices, that is his prerogative. !us those !omists 
who decry “interventionism” may not be as !omistic as they think.
C
S, S. T’  differs at times from modern design 
arguments. For one thing, !omas is more concerned with ontology than 
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biology or other natural sciences. His chief concern is why something should 
exist at all, not, say, the intricate features of particular biological organisms 
or the fine-tuning of physical constants. For another, !omas preferred de-
ductive arguments. ID proponents prefer newer forms of argumentation, 
especially “inference to the best explanation”—the method common in the 
historical sciences whereby one must not only weigh the strengths and weak-
nesses of a given hypothesis but also compare hypotheses with each other. In 
this fashion a scientist can decide which theory currently explains the data 
better than all rivals and yet remain open to new data or hypotheses which 
might change the equation. 
While they don’t provide the certainty of deductive conclusions, one ad-
vantage to these arguments is that they recognize that this finite world often 
requires tradeoffs: One cannot sit satisfied having raised questions about an 
ID argument; rather, he must show that his own hypothesis is better at ex-
plaining relevant data.
As Alexander Pruss, an analytical !omist and former Georgetown col-
league of John Haught, writes: 
On the compatibility between !omism and ID, the answer is surely 
positive. !us, one might think that the irreducible complexity types 
of arguments provide a strong probabilistic case for design and that 
the existence of teleology provides a sound deductive argument for a 
first cause.”30
Nevertheless, despite the different subject matter and styles of argumen-
tation, !omists and ID theorists have, as we have seen, much in common. 
!e dismissal of intelligent design by some contemporary !omists is un-
fortunate. For if reality is a unified whole, that is, if it stems from the divine 
mind as !omas believed, would it not be odd if good philosophy concluded 
that life is designed but good science concluded that life was not?
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